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Problem-Solving Courts and the Defense
Function: The Wisconsin Experience
BEN KEMPINEN*
Problem-solving courts have emerged as one of the fastest growing innovations in the
criminal justice system. Their growth has not been without controversy, given their
dramatic departure from a traditional adversary model in favor of a collaborative
approach in dealing with offenders with serious alcohol or substance abuse, or mental
health issues. The most outspoken criticism of this approach has come from the defense
bar. This Essay suggests much of the criticism is misplaced, and, that if care is exercised
in separating the roles that defense counsel plays in communities with problem-solving
courts the promise of this approach for appropriate offenders can be realized without
compromising the core duties that counsel owes her client. The template proposed here
for reconciling these conflicting interests is based in large part on the work and
experiences of shareholders in Wisconsin problem-solving courts. It is further
suggested that the proposed ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function
fail to address most, if not all, of the unique defense function issues presented by the
problem-solving court model.
[13491
* Clinical Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Prosecution Project, University of
Wisconsin Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of problem-solving courts' as an option for
offenders with serious substance abuse problems is among the most
i. Throughout this Essay, the terms "problem-solving courts" and "treatment courts" will be
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discussed recent innovations in the criminal justice system. Although
these courts affect only a small percentage of cases,' their novelty and
abandonment of the traditional adversary model have generated both
substantial praise and substantial criticism. The most outspoken criticism
has come from the defense bar, which is perhaps surprising given that
problem-solving courts can offer a chance for treatment instead of
punishment and, if successful, can benefit a client in ways not possible
with traditional case processing. There appear to be two reasons for
these criticisms.
First is strong disagreement with problem-solving court proponents
who urge abandonment of the traditional defense role in favor of a
collaborative approach supportive of treatment objectives.3 To the extent
that some proponents of treatment fail to acknowledge that the choice to
seek treatment rather than to litigate belongs to the client and not to the
lawyer, the court, or the treatment team, this criticism is well-founded.
However, the better approach is to refine the structure of problem-
solving courts to accommodate the role of defense counsel rather than to
reject the alternative altogether.
A second source of defense criticism is grounded in two deep-seated
and persistent beliefs among many defense attorneys.' First, is the belief
that only traditional adversary processes adequately protect a
defendant's interests; second, is the belief that effective representation
can be achieved only by the aggressive assertion of procedural
protections. This criticism is manifest in academic discussions,' and finds
used interchangeably.
2. Candace McCoy, Commentary, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins
and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 4o AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2003).
3. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 479-80 (1999); Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of
N.Y., Lawyering for a New Age, Remarks at Fordham Law School's Sonnett Lecture Series (Apr. 8,
1998), in 67 FORDHAM L. REV. I, 5 (1998).
4. A third concern is perceived structural and operational flaws in some problem-solving courts.
Examples cited in the literature include the belief that prosecutors "dump" weak cases into treatment,
the concern that the courts improperly require a treatment decision before the case can be thoroughly
investigated, and the sense that the process imposes harsher treatment on failed participants than
those eschewing treatment courts altogether. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings
of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 54-
56, 58-59, 61-62 (2oos). There is no question that many courts that claim to be problem-solving courts
have serious design and implementation flaws. However, these are correctable and are not a reason to
abandon the promise of treatment for appropriate offenders. A defense presence in the planning and
oversight of the court can prevent such procedures from inclusion in the local court design at all.
5. See generally, e.g., Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice": The Over-Emergence of Specialty
Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 4o SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I (20o6)
(discussing the dangers of the changed defender role from an adversarial, zealous advocate to that of a
team player in specialty courts); Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat
Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539 (2oo7) (challenging Professor David Wexler's suggestion of
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support in several of the proposed revisions to the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for the Defense Function' and in the reports of national
defense organizations.! Given that problem-solving courts present a
different model, they are seen as a threat to the fairness of our justice
system, to the interests of individual defendants, and to the very essence
of the defense function. However, the intimation that there is only one
appropriate systemic design and approach to advocacy is unfortunate.
This viewpoint undervalues client autonomy and fails to acknowledge
that well-informed and competent clients may very well choose
treatment over litigation. Defense counsel's preference for litigation
cannot trump an informed client's wishes. An exclusive focus on
litigation fails to acknowledge that the vast majority of cases are settled
rather than tried with procedures not altogether different from those in
problem-solving courts.' A preoccupation with adversary processes risks
undervaluing the distinct skills necessary for effective advocacy in
nonadversary settings.
Additionally, a defense predisposition against innovation will not
prevent system experimentation. It only prevents the defense bar from
meaningful involvement in the planning and implementation of such
efforts, a role that can preserve the positive elements of a problem-
solving approach without abandoning traditional procedural protections.
My view of the role of counsel in problem-solving courts is based in
large part on my research of Wisconsin practices since 2oo6.' In the
adopting therapeutic jurisprudence principles and supporting a traditional advocacy role); Quinn,
supra note 4 (analyzing drug treatment court practices from the perspective of a criminal defense
attorney practicing in the Bronx Treatment Court); Jane M. Spinak, Commentary, Why Defenders Feel
Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problem-Solving Courts, 4o Am. Clum. L. REV. I617 (2003)
(describing the reasons why defenders do not share the same experiences as other stakeholders in
creating and executing problem-solving courts).
6. Several of the proposed Defense Function Standards focus on the role of counsel in contested
cases. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION H§ 4-7.1 to 4-9.6 (Proposed Revisions
2009). The focus of the remaining sections, although broadly framed, is on defense counsel in their
traditional role. See generally id.
7. In September of 2009, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL")
issued a report that, on the whole, is critical of problem-solving courts and reflects a clear preference
for counsel to act as partisan advocates in an adversary framework. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING CouRTs: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR
REFORM (2oo9). In my view, the report was written to support the NACDL's predisposition against
problem-solving courts rather than to provide a report that could make valuable contributions to the
dialogue about the role of defense counsel in such courts.
8. For example, 96.3% of federal criminal cases in 2oo9 were resolved by plea rather than trial.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STAsTSTcs tbl. ii (2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data.andStatistics/AnnuaLReportsandSourcebooks/2oo 9 /SBTOCo9 .htm.
9. I have taught criminal law at the University of Wisconsin Law School since 1976, both in the
classroom and in the clinical offerings at the Remington Center, a clinical program at our school. At
the time of my investigation, thirteen treatment courts were in operation in Wisconsin. Now, there are
at least twenty that are either fully operational or in the planning stages. During the summer of 2oo6, I
observed five of these courts in great detail in Barron, Dane, Eau Claire, La Crosse, and Waukesha
[Vol. 62: 13491352
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summer and fall of 2006, I inventoried local innovations in selected
Wisconsin communities in a joint project of the University of Wisconsin
Law School and the Wisconsin Supreme Court's Planning and Policy
Advisory Committee Alternatives to Incarceration Subcommittee.o
Perhaps the most impressive finding was a growing transition from a
purely adversarial model to greater collaboration among local
stakeholders and a willingness to experiment with new alternatives to
achieve public safety. The emergence of problem-solving, or treatment,
courts was a central feature of these new efforts.
My observations of Wisconsin problem-solving courts showed a very
different picture than that described by critics of this model. I did not
observe pressure on defense attorneys to abandon their traditional
duties, nor did I observe systems where adversary safeguards were
jettisoned in favor of treatment. Instead, I observed communities where
judges, attorneys, and health care providers worked together in good
faith to see if new responses to drug and alcohol abuse might accomplish
that which traditional approaches could not. In these communities, the
roles and practices of defense attorneys were multifaceted and nuanced
in ways not mentioned in academic discussions. Counsel's actions fit into
one or more of three distinct roles: (i) as a member of the problem-
solving court planning or advisory group, (2) as a member .of the
problem-solving court treatment team, and (3) as a lawyer for an
individual client.
Wisconsin attorneys did not self-define their roles as I describe them
here. Through a process of collaborative trial and error, their actions
seemed to evolve naturally into one or more of the three categories. The
attorneys acted in these roles because they worked: These roles allowed
defense counsel to have a voice in the creation and operation of
problem-solving courts, while at the same time allowing for effective
representation of individual clients. These distinctions have broader
value-they offer a way of conceptualizing counsel's work in problem-
solving courts, which preserves the option of treatment for appropriate
offenders, respects the value of a vibrant defense role in all aspects of the
court's creation and operation, and accommodates the core responsibilities
a lawyer owes her client.
Counties. I interviewed team members and other interested criminal justice actors, observed team
meetings and court sessions, and reviewed procedure and policy manuals, statistical reports, and
memoranda of understanding among local system actors. Since that time, I have continued to track
these efforts throughout Wisconsin. See BEN KEMPINEN, CRMIINAL JUSTICE INNOVATIONS IN WISCONSIN: A
PREUMINARY REPORT 55-56 (2oo6) [hereinafter KEMPINEN, PRELIMINARY REPORT]; Ben Kempinen, From
the Benches and Trenches: Criminal Justice Innovations in Wisconsin: Collaborative Decision Making,
30 JUST. Sys. J. 327 (2oo9).
io. This committee was recently renamed the Effective Justice Strategies Subcommittee.
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The first of these roles-defense counsel as a member of a problem-
solving court planning or advisory committee-does not implicate the
representation of clients at all and should not be viewed through the lens
of the traditional lawyer-client paradigm. Rather, it involves the role of
the lawyer as "an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice."" This role is distinct from
the lawyer representing a client and does not interfere with any duty owed
to individual clients. Importantly, this role gives voice to defense
perspectives in all aspects of a problem-solving court's creation and
operation.
The second role-defense counsel as a member of a problem-solving
court treatment team-is novel and unique, and apparently varies greatly
from court to court and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Defense counsel did not
represent participants in treatment, but were part of a group that
collaborated to design and to monitor a treatment plan for each program
participant. Defense attorney team members in courts that I observed were
wholeheartedly committed to the treatment team concept-its focus on
participant accountability, information sharing, and collaborative
decisionmaking. Fidelity to the team raised several complex but soluble
issues if current or former clients were program participants.
The third role-the attorney representing a client -implicates the
traditional duties of counsel. In the context of problem-solving courts, the
most important responsibility of counsel is to make sure the client makes an
informed choice on whether or not to seek treatment. In such cases, the
client is typically in the throes of drug or alcohol addiction, complicating
her ability to process information and to make sound choices. The
consultation involves additional challenges: the need to be knowledgeable
about addictive behaviors, the client's unique medical situation and
receptivity to treatment, the nature and structure of the local program, and
whether available treatment resources fit the client's needs. Much has been
made about the problem-solving model's rejection of traditional adversary
safeguards. However, as long as the choice is made by the client, and is
voluntary and informed, counsel's distaste for this option is irrelevant. And,
of course, if the client rejects treatment, the representation continues on a
traditional path.
This Essay has five parts. Part I reviews Wisconsin problem-solving
court practices. There is great variation in the structure and operation of
problem-solving courts. A basic understanding of common Wisconsin
practices provides a context through which the suggestions offered can
be critically examined. Parts II to IV are detailed discussions of the
distinct roles counsel have played in Wisconsin problem-solving courts
and the ethical implications of viewing the defense function in this way.
II. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr pmbl. I (2010).
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Throughout these Parts, this Essay notes whether and how the revisions
to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function and
existing ethics rules address these issues. Finally, the Essay offers some
thoughts on how the Wisconsin experience might contribute to
discussions of how best to encourage innovation without sacrificing the
fundamental responsibilities defense counsel owes her client.
The reader may find it odd that a paper presented as part of a
national dialogue about the proposed Defense Function Standards
makes scant mention of them. This is not an oversight. It is because the
Standards add little to the discussion of the defense role in problem-
solving courts. Whether greater attention is given in the core Criminal
Justice Standards or a more specific subset of related Standards, these
issues merit attention as problem-solving courts continue to proliferate
throughout the country."
I. WISCONSIN PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: COMMON THEMES AND
PRACTICES
A. THE IMPETUS FOR THE CREATION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Concerns over costs-typically the expected need for a new jail-
and dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to alcohol and substance
abuse provided the impetus to create problem-solving courts in
Wisconsin communities. 3 The decision to create such courts was, without
exception, local in nature, with little input or assistance from the state.14
More often than not, discussions began at the urging of a local judge or
county government official.
12. The ABA's practice of having distinct Standards for overlapping practice areas allows for
detailed treatment of specific subjects but also creates challenges for the casual observer attempting to
understand the ABA's position on a particular issue. For example, in the criminal justice area alone
the ABA's website lists twenty-three different Standards. Standards: About Criminal Justice Standards,
A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/policy/standards.htl- (last visited May
23, 201H). As of this writing, it appears that the Criminal Justice Standards Committee is preparing
distinct Standards on diversion and specialized courts that will likely address issues unique to problem-
solving courts. My colleague, Professor Walter J. Dickey, is the reporter for the ABA Diversion and
Special Courts Task Force Subcommittee. He reports that Standards dealing with many of the issues
discussed in this Essay are forthcoming. As of this writing, drafts of these Standards are not available.
13. During my visits to Wisconsin treatment courts in the summer and fall of 2oo6, virtually all of
the judges, prosecutors, defenders, and local government officials identified these reasons as animating
their creation of a treatment option for offenders with alcohol or substance abuse problems.
14. During the mid- to late-i99os, Congress provided substantial financial and technical support
to communities wishing to create problem-solving courts. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1519-27. All of
the Wisconsin communities that created problem-solving courts sought to take advantage of these
resources. At the state level, the Wisconsin legislature created the Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion ("TAD") grant program by Act 25, 2o05-2oo6 Leg. Sess. (Wis. 2005) (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 16.964(12) (2oo9)), which provided additional funding support. Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion (TAD) Program, Wis. COURT Sys., http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/programs/
alttreatment.htm (last modified Feb. 17, 201I)
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B. PLANNING AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES
The first step in considering creation of a problem-solving court was
the formation of an advisory and planning committee. The group typically
consisted of a local judge, a county board member, a prosecutor, a
representative from law enforcement, and the local public defender."
The group visited communities with existing problem-solving courts and
attended nationally-sponsored training sessions. It decided threshold
questions such as the target population, admission criteria, the legal
status of treatment participants, and program procedures. Although the
dynamics and allocation of authority within these groups varied from
county to county, the broad spectrum of membership, including the
public defender, served to ensure that the ultimate court design reflected
a composite of interests and points of view. After the court began
operations, the committee continued in an advisory and oversight role.
C. TREATMENT COURT FUNDING
Most counties received external funding for training and start-up
costs. After a court was established, costs were usually absorbed by each
county, sometimes with partial support from public or private grants. In
several northwestern Wisconsin counties, the state corrections agency
provided funding and supervisory resources. This was a direct response
to a perceived epidemic of methamphetamine abuse in those areas, for
which traditional responses had proven ineffectual.
Treatment services were the largest operational expense. In some
instances, existing county resources were reallocated to provide the
needed services. In others, the county contracted with private service
providers. All counties believed costs would be offset by savings in
reduced jail populations and that even greater future savings would be
realized as program graduates successfully reintegrated into their
communities. Participants were usually required to pay a fee to partially
defray program costs and to encourage financial responsibility.
Community service was available to those unable to pay.
D. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT STRUCTURE
In structure, philosophy, and operation, problem-solving courts
differ substantially from traditional criminal courts. The National
Association of Drug Court Professionals ("NADCP") has identified ten
"key components" of this type of court. They include:
(t) Integrating treatment services with traditional case-processing;
15. There was no visible private defense presence in Wisconsin in the planning and oversight
process. This was likely a function of the financial difficulty in making a time-consuming commitment
and the relatively small size of the private defense bar rather than a lack of interest.
1356 [Vol. 62:I349
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(2) Adopting a nonadversarial, team approach to offenders'
problems;'6
(3) Promptly identifying and placing offenders in the problem-
solving court program;
(4) Providing a continuum of services depending on the particular
offender's needs;
(5) Regularly monitoring a participant's compliance with program
requirements;
(6) Combining a system of prompt rewards and sanctions for
program participants;
(7) Interacting with each program participant on a regular judicial
basis;
(8) Adequately keeping records to continually monitor the
achievement of program objectives;
(9) Continuing interdisciplinary education and evaluation of best
practice strategies; and
(io) Creating partnerships between problem-solving courts, justice
agencies and the community at large to support the
initiatives. 7
Shareholders in all of the Wisconsin counties visited relied on the
NADCP Key Components in designing and implementing their
treatment courts.
E. THE TREATMENT TEAM
At the core of all problem-solving courts was the treatment team.
Wisconsin treatment teams included the trial judge and treatment
professionals. In most, a probation agent, prosecutor, and public
defender were also members, as were, in a few, local law enforcement
representatives.' The team made both general policy and individual case
decisions. The public defender team member did not represent clients in
treatment simultaneously with their participation as team members.
Traditional roles were replaced by a collaborative model where all
worked together, openly shared information, and created individual
treatment plans for each program participant.
16. Key Component No. 2, with its call to embrace a collaborative team approach to the defense
function, has predictably been criticized. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note
7, at 30-34. Regrettably, its performance benchmarks fail to acknowledge client autonomy, the
potential conflicting ethical duties of counsel, or the varied and nuanced roles defense counsel may
play in communities with problem-solving courts.
I7. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & NAT'L Ass'N OF DRUG COURT PROr'LS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE
KEY COMPONENTS (reprt. 2004) (listing and discussing each "key component").
I8. In one county, the public defender temporarily withdrew from the team but has since
rejoined. In another, the prosecutor refused to assign an assistant to the treatment court, claiming a
lacking sufficient staff. Since that time, a new prosecutor was elected and has assigned an assistant to
the treatment team.
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F. ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION
Eligibility criteria were developed at the local level and differed
from court to court. 9 There were generally four steps in the screening
process: (I) a referral by the district attorney,o (2) an assessment and
recommendation by a treatment professional, (3) a request by the
offender to participate, and (4) the treatment team's decision to grant or
deny admission. A common theme with all admitted participants was the
desire to confront a serious drug or alcohol problem."
G. LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PARTICIPANT
All participants in Wisconsin's problem-solving courts had pending
criminal charges or had been convicted by a plea of guilty. Wisconsin
problem-solving courts were not diversion programs. Formal charges
provided judicial authority to impose and enforce treatment conditions.
There were two variations: pre- and post-judgment courts, with the latter
being the most common. In pre-judgment courts, each defendant was
charged with a crime, with traditional processes suspended while she was
involved in treatment. Typically, but not always, some future benefit
19. According to interviews with local actors involved in the creation of treatment courts, a
condition of federal funding was the exclusion of certain violent offenders. As a consequence, counties
receiving federal support adjusted their admission criteria accordingly. Those not reliant on federal
monies were free to define admission criteria without external limitations.
20. In all Wisconsin communities, cases were screened for prospective merit before any
consideration of referral to a problem-solving court was made. If a case was determined to be lacking
in proof or found otherwise wanting, no charges were filed. There was no evidence of "dumping
cases"-referring weak cases to treatment-as reported in other jurisdictions. Quinn, supra note 4, at
58-59. However, in some communities, referral decisions were controlled by the prosecutors
specializing in drug cases, some of whom did not believe in the treatment court model. This created a
risk of excluding appropriate candidates and frustrating basic program objectives. A solution to this
problem could be to rely on written admission criteria developed by the oversight committee rather
than the ad hoc decisions of individual prosecutors.
21. If an accused asked counsel to explore admission to treatment, it was critical for counsel to
understand the admission criteria and the process by which admission decisions were made. This was
more complicated and varied than one might imagine.
First, counsel needed to know if the client's situation fit into the targeted treatment
population in the particular county. Defining who and what to treat were among the first issues
decided in each treatment court. In northwestern Wisconsin, it was methamphetamine abusers; in
Madison, there was a mix of crack cocaine, heroin, and prescription drug users; and in Waukesha, the
team treatment targeted chronic alcoholics with repeat drunk driving offenses. Some observers opined
that some communities began with "easy" cases-casual use of recreational drugs-to ensure the
success of the program and to avoid a spectacular failure. In other communities, some recommended a
focus on offenders likely to receive jail rather than prison time. The expected savings in jail beds
would provide support for the treatment program. Awareness of the contours of the local discussion
was an important part of effectively advocating for admission.
Once the general target population was determined, individual admission decisions typically
had substantial flexibility. This provided opportunities for the experienced defense counsel to fashion
arguments that would resonate with the actual decisionmaker and contribute to effective client
preparation in anticipation of an intake interview.
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such as dismissal or amendment of charges was offered, conditioned on
completion of the program. A subclass of pre-judgment drug courts saw
offenders actually enter pleas of guilty without entry of judgment."
Authority over the participant derived from the bail authority granted
trial judges under chapter 969 of the Wisconsin Statutes.23 If the offender
graduated from the program, she would receive the promised concession,
usually a dismissal or reduction of the original charge. If the offender was
dismissed for noncompliance, the case returned to the traditional case-
processing track.'
In post-judgment courts, participants were convicted of a crime and
sentenced to probation. Treatment requirements were court-ordered
conditions. This allowed for the transfer of supervision costs from the
county to the state corrections agency."
In all cases, participants signed written contracts. They contained
both generic information about their rights and obligations, and
conditions unique to individual cases. Contracts ran from nine months to
two years with varying levels of treatment and aftercare.
22. The defense bar has criticized requiring a defendant to plead guilty as a precondition to entry
into a problem-solving court. Among the reasons advanced are a concern that coerced treatment is
unlikely to be successful, that defendants should not have to forfeit procedural rights to obtain
treatment, and a concern that treatment failures would be punished more severely than if the
defendant had been convicted without participation in treatment. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 25-26.
23. Conditional pleas of guilty were preferred-at least by prosecutors and trial courts-because
they preserved a conviction in the event of a program failure. The defendant would appear in court,
enter a plea of guilty or no contest, and engage in a typical colloquy with the court. See Wis. STAT.
§ 971.o8 (2oo9). The court would find the plea was voluntary and intelligently made, but judgment
would not be entered on the plea, avoiding a conviction. If, weeks or months later, the defendant was
expelled from treatment, judgment could be entered based on the prior findings and all that remained
would be sentencing. On the other hand, if the defendant successfully completed the program, charges
could be dismissed without the need to vacate a conviction. In this way, a conditional plea could serve
the interests of the defendant and the prosecutor and comply with Wisconsin statutory requirements.
Cf State v. Daley, 709 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (permitting a plea as part of a deferred
prosecution agreement). But cf State v. Dawson, 688 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing
denial of plea withdrawal because the reopen-and-amend provision of the plea agreement was legally
unenforceable). Not surprisingly, the National District Attorney's Association favors conditional
pleas, whereas defender organizations typically do not. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, supra note 7, at II; NAT'L DisT. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECuTION STANDARDS § 4-
3.6 (3d ed. 2009).
24. It has been suggested that in some treatment courts, failures are followed by more severe
punishments than if the offender had been convicted without being in treatment. NAT'L ASS'N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 7, at 29. No evidence of this was seen in Wisconsin.
25. An exception to the practice of transferring supervision costs to the state was the Waukesha
County treatment court, which focused exclusively on repeat drunk driving cases. Under then-existing
Wisconsin law, probation was not allowed for offenders with multiple prior drunk driving convictions.
As a consequence, the cost of supervising treatment court participants was borne by the county rather
than the state. KEMPINEN, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9.
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H. COMMON PROCEDURAL PRACTICES
r. Timing of Admission
The decision to consider treatment usually occurred shortly after
criminal charges were filed." There was no difference in the early stages
of a case between treatment and nontreatment court cases. Police or
citizen referrals were screened by prosecutors according to normal
procedures; counsel was appointed; and discovery was exchanged
according to local practice. There was no evidence that unprovable cases
were referred for treatment or that defendants were forced to decide
whether to seek treatment before their attorney could thoroughly review
their case. This was as much a result of resource levels as program
design-in most communities, there was a backlog of applicants waiting
for admission to treatment."
2. Treatment Team Staffings
Several features distinguished Wisconsin's problem-solving courts
from traditional courts. Two of the most significant were team meetings
before each court session to discuss each case on the calendar as well as
continuing appearances in court during the course of treatment. Team
meetings were scheduled early in the morning prior to the court session.
Team members then reviewed the case of each participant scheduled to
appear that day. Team discussions were frank and open; traditional
formulations of the roles of trial judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney
were noticeably absent. Given the close monitoring of each participant,
the team knew significantly more about the participant than would be
known in a traditional case processing system. The unstated, yet clearly
shared, goal was to make the offender succeed, not to "close" the case,
punish the participant, or remove the participant from the program.
Neither the participants nor their lawyers were present at team meetings.
3. A Prototypical Treatment Court Hearing
From the first instant, it became clear that problem-solving court
hearings were different from traditional criminal court proceedings. Rare
was the mention of case file numbers or offense names; the dialogue
focused on the participants' lives, their families, their problems, their
successes, and their failures. Depending on participants' progress or
perceived treatment needs, they were required to appear on a weekly,
26. In some communities, treatment court was used as an alternative to revocation of probation,
parole, or extended release. In this situation, entry into treatment might be months or years after
conviction and sentencing.
27. There are troubling reports that, in some jurisdictions, defendants are forced to decide
quickly whether to pursue treatment or to forfeit the opportunity before their attorney has received
discovery or completed investigation of the case. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 5, at 4-7. Without
question, problem-solving courts must be designed to accommodate the need for defense counsel to
obtain discovery, investigate, and consult with the client.
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biweekly, or monthly basis. If they had done well since the last hearing,
they were praised and often rewarded with a gift certificate from a local
restaurant or movie theater. If they had relapsed or failed to meet a
condition, they faced an immediate sanction: ranging from denial of
permission to travel out of the county, to a night in jail, to outright
dismissal from the program. Many participants admitted relapses-using
drugs or alcohol-usually early in the process. Although many violations
constituted criminal conduct, none were charged, given the policy of
immunizin participants from admissions made in the course of
treatment.
Each participant scheduled to appear on a particular day was
expected to remain for the entire session of drug court, even after their
appearance was completed. As a group, they applauded a coparticipant's
successes or voiced collective disappointment upon hearing of another's
failings.
4. The Role of the Trial Judge
The trial judge's role in problem-solving courts was very different
from the traditional role of passive neutrality." The court was actively
involved in treatment decisions and predisposed to do all in its power to
help the participant succeed. Information flowed freely between judge,
treatment professionals, prosecutor, and defense attorney; the normal
filters of confidentiality and evidentiary privileges did not apply.
Whatever was known or suspected by any team member was known by
all, including the trial judge. The trial judge participated in the weekly
staff meetings, was familiar with the details of each defendant's situation,
and personally engaged each participant at their court appearances.
In some cases, the judge even acted as an advocate for the
participant in need of legal advice -suggesting how to deal with an
overdue utilities bill or how to seek visitation with one's children-in
addition to monitoring the person's treatment progress.
The trial judge was the central authority figure in treatment court,
bearing ultimate responsibility to mete out an award or sanction, or to
permit a defendant to remain in the program. Although most decisions
28. There was general agreement that a participant's admission of drug use could not be the basis
of a new possession charge. Less clear was the propriety of use of admissions to investigate others who
may have provided the drugs, or what should occur if the participant admitted to a very serious crime,
for example, a homicide or serious sexual assault. Several defense attorneys appropriately complained
about the lack of clarity about the scope of immunity, explaining that it prevented them from fully and
accurately explaining the risks of entry into a treatment program. The scope of immunity remains an
issue in need of additional clarification in problem-solving court practice.
29. See Greg Berman, What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway?: Problem Solving in the State Courts,
84 JUDICATURE 78, 8o (2ooo); Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-
Solving Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts,
65 MD. L. REv. 82, 87 (2oo6); James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, SocIETY, Jan./Feb. 2002, at
29, 32.
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reflected the collective view of the entire team, the trial judge was in
control, both in the eyes of the offender and in those of the treatment
team.3 o
5. The Roles of the Team Members at the Hearing
After the trial judge, treatment professionals and probation agents
were the second-most important players during the court hearings. This
was not surprising. Treatment, rather than retribution, was the focus of
the program, and the treatment professionals and agents had more
training and continuing contact with participants than did the other team
members. The trial judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney team
members often looked to treatment professionals and agents for
guidance in managing the participants' program experience. During
court hearings, the treatment professional or agent typically sat at
counsel table where defense counsel would be seated in a traditional
court setting.
The prosecutor and public defender team members played lesser
roles at the hearings." The prosecutor provided case information and
answered legal questions that arose. The role of the public defender team
member was less clear. Like the prosecutor, the public defender was
sometimes called upon to answer legal questions. However, the public
defender did not represent program participants and rarely had contact
with a participant during a hearing." This was in contrast to the team
meetings, where the public defender was an equal partner in discussions
and decisionmaking.
6. The Role of the Participant's Defense Attorney
Once the client was admitted into the treatment program, Wisconsin
defense attorneys -public and private-assumed that their role in the
case was over. Not once did I see defense counsel for a participant
appear at a problem-solving court hearing. A number of explanations
were provided.
The most common, at least in post-judgment cases, was that the case
was over and counsel's responsibilities were finished. Admission to
30. One criticism of problem-solving courts is their drain on scarce judicial resources. Several of
the judges interviewed raised concerns that treatment courts would strain already limited judicial
resources given that program participants would appear in court several times over the course of
treatment, compared with one or two appearances under a traditional processing model. However, it
seemed clear that the stature of the judge and respect for judicial authority was critical to the
operation of the courts observed. It is difficult to imagine what other system actor could fill that role.
31. In one court, there was no defense presence, and in another, no prosecutor.
32. On occasion, the trial judge referred a question from a participant to the public defender team
member. I was not privy to these conversations, which were conducted away from the others present
in court. If the public defender team member did not represent the participant, information shared
would not be confidential. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. i.6(a) (20o). This suggests that the
public defender team member should explain this to the participant and clarify his role to avoid
confusion. Id. R. 4.3.
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treatment was viewed like the imposition of a sentence. And, in post-
judgment courts where probation was ordered with treatment as a
condition, it was in fact a sentence. Just as defense counsel do not
ordinarily track clients when they serve a jail sentence or are placed on
probation, none believed they had a responsibility to attend program
court sessions." Wisconsin public defenders closed their files at the point
of admission to treatment.
Although private attorneys did not view the end of representation in
such precise terms, many felt it was not financially feasible or practically
necessary to attend weekly treatment court hearings simply to observe
what would likely be a brief appearance, which could occur at any time
during a two-to-four hour court session and where the trial court wanted
to hear from the client, not the lawyer.
7. Violation of Problem-Solving Court Rules
When participants could or would not comply with treatment
requirements, they faced a variety of sanctions, including expulsion from
the program. Although myriad violations occurred in the nearly eighty
cases observed in various treatment courts, expulsion was discussed only
twice. Relapses were expected, especially early in the course of
treatment. Although many relapses involved criminal drug use, they
were seen as a failure of the treatment plan rather than a reason to issue
new criminal charges. The most typical response to a violation was to
modify the treatment plan. Treatment success, rather than punishment,
was the team's goal.
Treatment team members had a variety of ways of dealing with
serious program violations. In one county, the judge recused himself
from team discussions of expulsion, explaining that he expected to
preside over the expulsion hearing should one be scheduled. Other
judges participated in the decision to expel a participant because the
expulsion hearing would be transferred to another judge. Counsel was
appointed in all counties for participants faced with expulsion. The
hearings were similar to probation or parole revocation hearings, with
basic procedural safeguards but without the formality of a trial.
8. Graduation: Successful Completion of the Program
When a participant successfully completed treatment, a graduation
ceremony of sorts was held. I observed a handful of these hearings, and
they were among the most remarkable hearings that I have seen in more
than thirty years of practice and teaching. Typically, the participant was
praised for her hard work, awarded a certificate of completion, and
applauded by all other participants present for the day's hearings. I did
33. This explanation is less satisfactory in pre-judgment courts where treatment is a condition of
bail and criminal charges remain pending. Nonetheless, there were no defense attorneys in either pre-
or post-judgment Wisconsin problem-solving courts.
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not see defense counsel at any of these hearings. Promised concessions
were granted following program completion with minimal additional
process-at most, a perfunctory hearing-and often with the participant
unrepresented.
9. Evaluation and Assessment
Each county kept track of program successes and failures. Three
types of data were generated: the results of risk assessment tools used to
make admission decisions, the treatment records of participants,34 and
treatment-jail cost comparisons to demonstrate jail-bed savings. Only a
few of the courts were in existence long enough to generate the type of
statistical information that might begin to allow for long-term outcome
assessments.
I. WISCONSIN DEFENSE ATrORNEYS: PERSPECTIVES ON PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
I spoke to defense attorneys in each of the Wisconsin counties with
problem-solving courts. They expressed a wide range of opinions and
levels of knowledge about the underlying theory and day-to-day
administration of this type of court.
A substantial number-both public defenders and private defense
attorneys-were encouraged by the focus on treatment instead of
punishment for clients with chronic alcohol or substance abuse problems.
They sought to learn as much as possible about their local court program,
to enable them to explain this option accurately to their clients. Several
admitted a need to learn more about addictive behaviors and effective
interventions. At least one said he would seek an independent
assessment prior to recommending treatment. Even the most
enthusiastic, experienced lawyers noted that this option was viable only
for certain clients. Clients who struggled with probation or parole
supervision might not survive the structure and discipline of a problem-
solving court program. Attorneys for these kinds of clients believed
candid and accurate client counseling was critical. As long as their
clients' decisions were fully informed, they were not troubled in the least
by the broad waiver of rights that accompanied participation in
treatment.
A smaller but significant group of defense attorneys were
predisposed against treatment courts as a matter of principle. They were
outspoken and adamant about the danger of the wholesale waiver of
procedural rights, the lost opportunity to challenge the charges by any
and all means, and the abandonment of traditional safeguards for what
they viewed as an unproven product. They did not know, nor seemed to
34. Each county had policies about access to and use of participant medical records.
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care to know, a great deal about their local problem-solving courts, had
not observed them in operation, and, for the most part, had no interest in
doing so. It seemed clear that these attorneys would discourage their
clients from pursuing this option regardless of the circumstances.
A few attorneys, often recent law school graduates or attorneys who
were not criminal law specialists, were only generally aware of how
treatment courts functioned, particularly in communities where the
program was new. They did not have strong opinions for or against
problem-solving courts. Rather, they expressed a simplistic view of the
option, seeing it as another means to seek a charge or sentencing
concession from the prosecutor. They seemed willing to recommend
treatment without a clear understanding of what the program required or
whether their client had a realistic chance of success.
II. DIFFERENT ROLES: DEFENSE COUNSEL AS A MEMBER OF THE
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PLANNING AND ADVISORY GROUP
In Wisconsin, it was commonplace for a defense attorney-always a
public defender-to be a member of the problem-solving court's
planning and advisory group. A defense presence at the earliest stages
and in a continuing oversight role had substantial value. Public
defenders' sensitivity to procedural fairness and knowledge of their
clients' life circumstances contributed to responding effectively to many
of the issues involved in creating a problem-solving court. Such issues
include:
(I) What are the greatest substance abuse issues in our
community, and what is their impact?
(2) What substances or offenders should be the target of the
problem-solving court's efforts?
(3) What are the admission criteria, and should they be uniform or
flexible?
(4) How can procedures for case processing and admission to
treatment be designed to ensure that defense counsel has
sufficient time to receive discovery materials, investigate,
consult, and advise the client about the treatment option?
(5) What concessions should follow a participant's successful
completion of treatment?
(6) What waivers of procedural rights and confidentiality are
necessary and appropriate, and how can they best be explained
to prospective participants?
(7) What safeguards are necessary to protect the privacy of the
participant's treatment records during and after participation
in the program?
(8) To what extent should the participant's admissions of criminal
conduct be immunized if required as a condition of program
involvement?
May 2ox il] 1365
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(9) What, if any, is the proper role of defense counsel at treatment
team staffings or court hearings?
(io) What due process protections should apply when the treatment
team seeks to remove a participant for rule violations?
(II) Should there be a written contract between the participant and
treatment team, and, if so, what information should be
included, and who should sign the contract?
(12) How should cases be handled if the participant is terminated
from the program?
These questions represent a nonexhaustive list of issues in the
design and implementation of any problem-solving court. Much of the
criticism of the problem-solving court model is, in reality, a criticism of
individual courts whose design does not properly accommodate an
offender's right to counsel or incorporate appropriate measures of
procedural fairness in court procedures." But these problems can be
addressed more effectively by including a defense attorney's voice when
the problem-solving court is created, rather than attempting to litigate
systemic flaws on an individual, ad hoc basis or rejecting the treatment
approach altogether. The Wisconsin experience-with an active defense
presence in the design and implementation of its problem-solving
courts-provides clear proof of the effectiveness of this approach, given
that many of the problems identified with problem-solving courts in
other jurisdictions simply do not exist in Wisconsin.
Historically, the defense bar has not always been an equal player at
the policy-making stages of criminal justice systems. This is an
opportunity lost. Decisions made with no defense input undervalue the
interests of defendants and the importance of fair process. A review of
literature confirms there has often been little or no defense involvement
in the planning and oversight of problem-solving courts." Several reasons
have been suggested.
In some communities, it appears the defense bar may have been
intentionally excluded. If true, this is unfortunate, is inconsistent with
notions of collaboration that inhere in treatment modalities, and deprives
the community of valuable information unavailable elsewhere. In other
instances, the defense bar has apparently chosen not to participate, for
fear of not being an equal partner, because of concerns that a problem-
solving approach would not serve their clients' interests, or out of a
general distrust of problem-solving courts.37 Some attorneys have also
35. See supra notes 4, 20, 24, & 27.
36. See Spinak, supra note 5, at 1618-23.
37. It is often true that defense attorneys do not speak with a single voice and that even within a
single defender agency, there can be significant differences of opinion on matters of policy. Id. at 1619.
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suggested that a defense presence in policymaking could result in
systemic changes that might harm individual clients.
Ethics codes and practice standards give only fleeting attention to
defense counsel functioning as a policy maker. The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct mention the attorney's role as an "officer of the
legal system" and a "public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice" only in the preamble.3 ' The proposed Defense
Function Standards announce a duty to the "administration of justice"
but suggest the primary means to do so is by providing quality
representation to individual clients.40 This is unfortunate and ironic given
that much of the ABA's work reflects lawyers, both private and public,
giving their time to help improve the profession and legal system. The
potential benefits of an active defense presence at this level of system
functioning are clear.4' And, if defense counsel sees himself as an "officer
of the legal system" and a "citizen" with special knowledge, this role
presents no conflicts or other ethical problems in relation to existing
clients.
III. DIFFERENT ROLES: DEFENSE COUNSEL AS A MEMBER OF THE
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT TREATMENT TEAM
In one sense, the role of defense counsel as a treatment team
member can be easily described: to be part of a group whose collective
goal is designing and managing a treatment program for a problem-
solving court participant. This role becomes more complicated when
defense counsel is expected to act as a team member while
simultaneously representing an individual program participant.
38. It has been suggested to the Author by defense attorneys on more than one occasion that the
defense bar should not participate in reform of system flaws that some individual clients have been
able to exploit for their benefit. Justifications for this perspective range from the view that defense
counsel must never act to eliminate a potential benefit for a current or future client to the opinion that
defense counsel's responsibility to the system is limited to effective representation of individual clients.
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. I I (20o0). The only other mention of an attorney
acting in an advisory or oversight capacity is found in Rule 6.3, discussing the application of conflict of
interest rules to the lawyer acting in a law reform capacity. Id. R. 6.3.
40. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-.2(b) (Proposed Revisions 2009)
Standard 4-1.2(d) does provide that "[diefense counsel should seek to reform and improve the
administration of criminal justice" when "inadequacies" or "injustices" exist. In the eyes of many
defense attorneys, this call to duty is limited to system practices that inure to the detriment of
offenders and not to overall system reform. Id.
41. The policy and procedure manuals adopted by Wisconsin treatment courts bear the imprint of
defense input on many of these issues, reflecting a balance between treatment goals and procedural
fairness. See, e.g., ST. CROIX CNTY. DRUG COURT PROGRAM, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (2007)
(on file with the Author).
42. Complications for the defense attorney team member also arose if a former client or former
firm client were involved in treatment. Possible solutions to these problems are offered infra notes 51-
57 and accompanying text.
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An examination of the interests that inhere in the two roles
demonstrates the difficulty. The defining feature of being a treatment
team member is fidelity to the team-a commitment to an open and
collaborative decisionmaking process, full sharing of information, and a
collective goal of having the participant succeed in treatment. In
Wisconsin, defense counsel team members thrived in this role; they
embraced it enthusiastically and added a valuable perspective not
provided by other team members.
In contrast, the lawyer for an individual client owes allegiance to the
client, and must, as part of that responsibility, protect confidential
information,43 pursue the lawful objectives selected by the client
regardless of the wishes of nonclients," and avoid interests that would
interfere with providing that which the client demands.45 Imagine a
participant who tired of treatment, wished to quit, began using drugs
again, and confided all of this to her lawyer. Imagine further that her
lawyer was a treatment team member. If counsel honored her
commitment to the client, she would betray her responsibilities as a team
member. If she shared the client's confidences with the team, she would
violate her duty to her client. There is no way the lawyer's "personal
interest" in team membership could be maintained while serving her
client's interests.
This situation presents a classic example of a concurrent conflict of
interest. 6 The problem has not been given adequate attention by
proponents of the problem-solving court model.47 The conflict can and
should be prevented by a blanket prohibition against team members
representing program participants.4" This seemed to be the practice in
Wisconsin communities, even though it had not evolved into a clear and
unequivocal policy.49
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
44. See id. R. 1.2(a).
45. See id. R. 1.7-10.
46. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCrION § 4-3.5(b) (Proposed
Revisions 2009).
47. See supra note 16.
48. At least one treatment court model in an adjoining state involved a single defense attorney as
team member and counsel for all participants. This exposes counsel to the risk of multiple conflicts
between the duty owed to each individual team member and the duty owed to the team, as well as
conflicts between individual team members. In a population of chronic alcohol and drug abusers, it is
neither uncommon for participants to have knowledge of the violations of other participants nor is it
unusual for them to serve as sources of information. The potential conflicts for a single lawyer serving
in these multiple roles are manifest and should be avoided.
49. This separation would be difficult in smaller communities with a limited defense bar. If
separation of roles is not possible, ethics rules require either that the team member recuse herself from
cases involving current or former clients, or that the participant make an informed written waiver of
the conflict. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.10 (2010).
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Defense counsel's status as a team member in the community where
she practices could raise other ethical issues as well. In Wisconsin, all
defense team members were public defenders. On several occasions, they
knew a participant as a former or current agency client. If they shared
knowledge about that participant with the team, they were disclosing
client confidences."o If they withheld relevant information, they were not
honoring their commitment to the team. An ethical violation could only
be avoided by seeking a waiver of confidentiality from the participant.
Given the rule of imputed disqualification," some action would be
necessary even if the team member was not familiar with the former
agency client's case. Under Model Rule I.io and state variants of the
Rule, the conflict of one firm member is imputed to all firm members."
A public defender agency would seem to be a firm within the meaning of
the rules. In the context of problem-solving courts, this means that if any
assistant public defender is conflicted out of a case, all others in her
office would be as well. The strictest interpretation of the rule would
mean that no public defender could serve as a team member if any
participant was ever represented by someone in the same office. The
rigidity of this rule in other contexts has led to a call for exceptions that
would allow conflicted attorneys to be screened off from involvement in
the case giving rise to the conflict.53
Whether conflict screening should be allowed has been a divisive
issue within the ABA and state ethics committees, with more than
twenty distinct responses in different jurisdictions.54 By way of illustration,
Wisconsin has a narrow screening provision that applies in very narrow
circumstances and would not resolve the conflict between a public
defender functioning as a treatment team member when colleagues
represent or have represented treatment court participants." Whether
screening would be a viable solution to conflict problems would require
examination of the particular jurisdiction's screening rules. If screening
were permitted, the lawyer could continue as a team member even if the
conflicted former agency client objected.
If screening were not possible, another option would be to require
that the participant waive any objections to the team member's presence
50. Model Rule I.6 protects all "information" related to the representation and imposes no time
limit on the duty of confidentiality. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.6. Unless some form of
consent to disclosure were obtained, it would be inappropriate for the public defender team member
to share past knowledge about a participant.
51. Seeid. R. L.o.
52. Id.
53. See generally George A. Kuhlman, Follow the Middle Road, A.B.A. J., May 2009.
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Recommendation 1o9 (2oo9), available at
http://americanbar.org/content/dam/abamigrated/leadership/2oo9/midyear/daily-journal/Adoptedio9.
authcheckdam.doc.
55. Wis. Sup. Cr. R. 20:1.10 (2011).
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as a condition of participation in treatment. Such waivers need not be
completely open ended. They could provide some agreed upon limit on
disclosure or screening in return for a waiver of conflict and
confidentiality protections." The waiver would have to be in writing,
signed by the participant."
A final response to conflict issues would be to require the defense
counsel team member to recuse herself from cases involving conflicts.
This would change the team dynamic and remove a defense voice from
team deliberations but would avoid the ethical problem.
The manner in which cases are staffed in problem-solving courts
also presents the issue of ex parte communications with the court. Model
Rule 3.5 prohibits an attorney from having ex parte contacts with the
court.58 The text of the Rule does not limit its reach to representation of
clients as do certain other rules." As a consequence, the Rule appears to
prohibit contacts by the attorney team members-both the public
defender and the prosecutor-with the judge in the absence of the
participant or her lawyer, regardless of how one envisions the roles of the
attorney team members. The most obvious solution would be to require,
as a condition of program involvement, participant consent to
communications for the purpose of team meetings.6
There are similarities between the defense attorney member of a
planning or oversight committee and an attorney team member in a
problem-solving court. In a sense, both act as "officer[s] of the legal
system and public citizen[s] having special responsibility for the quality
of justice."6' Neither role inherently involves representation of a client.
However, the defense attorney team member participates in real cases
with real clients and makes real decisions that could be adverse to a
current or former client. This distinction makes constructing the team
member's role complex and fraught with ethics questions. The Model
Rules provide a path through the thicket, even if it is not the clearest or
most direct path. The proposed Defense Function Standards do not
acknowledge this role and, as a consequence, do not provide useful
commentary on how it might be structured or separated from the other
roles defense counsel may play.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.7 (b)(4) (20o). The proposed Defense Function
Standards contain conflict of interest provisions that somewhat parallel those of the Model Rules. See
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION H§ 4-1.4 to 4-3.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
They add little to the task of avoiding conflicts of interest for the problem-solving court team member.
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. I.7(b)(4).
58. Id. R. 3-5
59. See, e.g., id. R. 4.2, 4.3.
6o. Another view expressed is that the judge is not acting as a "court" at team meetings, and thus,
the Rule would not apply to these meetings.
61. MODEL RULES OF PEOF'L CONDucr pmbl. 1 1 (2010).
62. Caution suggests it would also be best if the defense attorney team member did not see
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IV. DIFFERENT ROLES: THE LAWYER REPRESENTING INDIVIDUAL
CLIENTS IN COMMUNITIES WITH PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
A fundamental and well-founded defense objection to problem-
solving courts is that defense counsel should not be forced to embrace a
collaborative role that may be antithetical to the client's wishes. A
second objection is systemic in nature: that treatment is improperly
purchased at the cost of abandoning nearly all traditional procedural
safeguards enjoyed by the accused.
Separation of the roles of defense counsel, as proposed here,
provides an answer to the first objection, which is a legitimate concern in
jurisdictions that have sought to combine the roles either for fiscal
reasons or because of a failure to carefully consider the different
responsibilities that inhere in each role.
The second objection reflects an overly simplistic view of advocacy,
failing to take into account that the dynamics of a treatment court
require a very different type of presence than a contested trial or
hearing-an alternative approach to advocacy that is discussed later in
this Part. The objection also fails to acknowledge that when a client
participates in treatment, she has chosen this path and rejected litigation,
a choice that is hers to make.
The advent of problem-solving, or treatment, courts changes the
context but not the nature of defense counsel's responsibilities to the
client. Unchanged are the responsibilities to protect client confidences,63
to provide competent representation, including investigation of the facts
and law,64 and to present an informed assessment of the case, 6
enumerating the client's choices and the likely consequences of each.6
herself as attorney for the team. This would avoid another potential ethical problem: contact with
represented persons without the consent of their lawyer. Model Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney
"representing a client" from contacting with a person known to be represented in the same matter.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.2 (2010). This Rule could be violated if the team member were
viewed as representing the team, the interests of the team and the participant were potentially adverse,
the treatment court participant continued to be represented by separate counsel, and there was contact
between the team member and the participant at the court hearing. This problem is avoided if the
team member does not act as attorney for the team or for any participant. It would also be good
practice for the defense attorney team member to explain her role to a participant-especially that she
is not a lawyer for the participant or the team-whenever there is contact between the two. This could
go far in avoiding the risk of confusion regarding the relationship between the public defender team
member and program participants.
63. Id. R. 1.6.
64. Id. R. I.',1 .3.
65. Id. R. 1.2, 1.4.
66. The proposed contours of effective representation when treatment is an option find support
in the proposed Defense Function Standards. For example, Standards 4-5.1 and 4-5.4 emphasize the
importance of a thorough investigation to enable counsel to discuss all aspects of the case adequately
with his client. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION H§ 4-5.1, 4-5.4 (Proposed
Revisions 2009). This may involve treatment, id. § 4-6.1, and the need to engage experts, id. § 4-4.3.
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At the early stages of any case, counsel needs sufficient time to
investigate and to consult with the client.7 This means that problem-
solving courts must be structured to allow a reasonable time for counsel
to obtain discovery, to explore whether the government's case is
provable, to determine whether viable defenses exist or whether
evidence may be subject to suppression, and to discuss her findings and
conclusions with the client."
Informing a client of her options and the potential risks and benefits
of each are among the most important responsibilities of any lawyer in
any type of case. In the context of problem-solving courts, there appear
to be at least three components to the consultation: (i) a thorough
assessment of the strength of the state's case and the possibility of
success in contesting the charges, (2) a candid and informed discussion
about the client's substance abuse problem and commitment to
confronting it, and (3) a clear presentation of precisely what the treatment
court experience would involve on a day-to-day basis-the program
requirements, what procedural rights would be waived, available charge
or sentence concessions, and the consequences of failure.
Making sure the client's decision is truly informed may be counsel's
most important responsibility in this type of case, because the option is
so different from traditional choices and can involve extraordinary
demands upon the client, albeit with the chance for extraordinary
benefits. Even if counsel is predisposed against the problem-solving court
model, as were several attorneys interviewed by this Author, it would be
inappropriate not to present this option fully and accurately to the
client.6 If defense counsel has satisfied this responsibility, and the client
understands her options, her informed choice controls the direction of
the case, and defense counsel's contrary preferences become moot."o Of
course, if the choice is to reject treatment, representation will follow a
traditional trajectory.
A remaining issue is the proper role of counsel after the client is
admitted to treatment, or, for that matter, if counsel should have any role
at all. As noted earlier, when admission to treatment followed conviction
and was part of a probation sentence, most Wisconsin attorneys believed
their representation was over, even as the demands on the client were
just beginning. This view is not without support. Rare is the case where
67. See id § 4-4-1.
68. Inadequate time to investigate was not a problem in Wisconsin, largely due to waiting lists for
entry into treatment. It may be that a vocal defense presence at the planning stage can help to develop
procedures to accommodate these legitimate concerns and to obviate the need to raise them in
individual cases.
69. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION H§ 4-5-1, 4-6.1 (Proposed Revisions
2009).
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
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an offender sentenced to jail or probation-even with demanding
conditions- enjoys the continued involvement of counsel to mediate
issues with the jailor or probation agent. Does the fact that the problem-
solving model involves continued court involvement rather than simply a
custodian or probation agent change the responsibilities of defense
counsel? Implicit in some of the criticisms of problem-solving courts is
the assumption that counsel has a continuing responsibility to the client
until she either graduates from treatment or is removed, and the case is
resolved by other means." There is no clear authority imposing this
duty -particularly in the postconviction context-and there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that no such duty exists.72
Nonetheless, even if not statutorily or constitutionally required,
continued defense counsel involvement could have value if counsel's
presence effectively responds to the unique characteristics and structure
of problem-solving courts. In traditional litigation, the attorney stands
between the client and the state. The attorney speaks for her client and
asserts procedural protections to prevent the client from making
admissions of culpable conduct. In contrast, if the client has agreed to
treatment, she has also agreed to be candid and forthright, to admit to
relapses and missteps, and ultimately, to be accountable for the choices
she has made. Interposing defense counsel between the client and the
court or treatment team to frustrate this form of accountability is
irreconcilable with the philosophy of treatment as well as with the
agreement the client made in accepting treatment. A traditional
approach to advocacy could do the client more harm than good.
This is not to say that there is no productive role for counsel to play.
She may work to ensure a fair admission process and a treatment
contract geared to her client's needs. 73 She can prepare the anxious or
71. Implicit in the duty to provide competent representation is a responsibility to see the case
through until its conclusion. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.1 (20oo). The proposed Defense
Function Standards address the continuing responsibilities of counsel. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.3 (Proposed Revisions 2oo9). Of course, in the new world of
problem-solving courts, there are differing views of when a case is concluded.
72. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been interpreted to apply when one is accused of a
crime and faced with a "critical stage" of the proceeding. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 598-60 (5th ed. 2oo9). Although the initial sentencing hearing is deemed a critical stage,
and due process has been interpreted as requiring the assistance of counsel in probation revocation
proceedings, there is scant discussion in case law or literature of whether the regular court
appearances required in problem-solving courts should be viewed as "critical stages" of the
proceeding. Id.
73. All treatment court participants were required to sign a written contract. Counsel would do
well to review the contract, to seek modifications if appropriate and possible, and to make sure the
client understands to what she is agreeing. Some counties anticipated the involvement of defense
counsel and included a signature line for defense counsel. Others did not. There were wide variations
in the information included in the contract-some thoroughly describing all aspects of the program
and others providing a much more abbreviated document. It would seem wise to err in favor of detail.
Presumably if counsel had thoroughly advised the client beforehand, the contract would simply
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inarticulate client for her regular court appearances. She can bring
important facts and concerns to the attention of the team. She can work
to make sure the testing processes and procedures are not prone to error;
and, if they are, she can bring her concerns to the attention of the court
and treatment team. She can remain a continuing source of support and
encouragement for the client who is struggling to overcome her addiction.
These actions can involve out-of-court contact with the client or a
measured presence at team meetings and court hearings.
Continuing involvement can also ensure that the attorney is aware
of the client's progress and will be adequately informed should the need
arise to defend against a claimed rule violation, if the client chooses to
leave the program or is involuntary expelled. The length and duration of
defense counsel's obligation to a client in treatment is one of the
important unresolved issues in the problem-solving court model.
CONCLUSION: WISCONSIN EFFORTS TO REDEFINE ROLES AND BEYOND
From the earliest stages, Wisconsin problem-solving team members
acknowledged that their responsibilities and relationships would be
substantially different from a traditional adversary model. It seems that
as one new question has been answered, two more have emerged.
Nonetheless, Wisconsin actors continue to work collaboratively to
balance a problem-solving approach with traditional ethical
responsibilities and the requirements of due process. Their early efforts
did not draw clear distinctions between the various roles of defense
counsel in treatment courts.74 Missteps were made. At the same time,
provide another review of matters previously discussed.
74. For example, the initial Memorandum of Understanding for the Eau Claire County Drug
Court Program explained the defense role as follows:
The Public Defender's Office
Shall assign a lawyer who will provide the following services:
I. Attend team meetings as necessary
2. The public defender or private defense attorney will make referrals to the drug court
team after explaining the nature, purpose, and rules of drug court
3. The public defender or private attorney will encourage the participants to be truthful
with the judge and treatment staff since admitting drug or alcohol use in court will not be
the basis of new criminal charges
4. The public defender will be an active member of the drug court treatment team
5. The public defender will review the client's progress in treatment and advocate for fair
process when a client is facing sanctions or termination
6. Provide representation for the participant in termination proceedings if eligible
7. The public defender will be a community advocate for the Drug Court Program
EAU CLAIRE CNTY. DRUG COURT PROGRAM, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2007) (on file with the
Author). Note that items 2, 3, 5, and 6 address the role of counsel as attorney for a client. Items I, 4,
and 7 speak to defense counsel as a member of the treatment team.
Similarly, the St. Croix County Drug Court Program Policies and Procedures Manual
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they have shown continued good faith, cooperation, an openness to
critically examine their own actions, and the effectiveness of a problem-
solving approach to drug and alcohol abuse. Their commitment to this
approach is practical rather than theoretical-as long as it helps clients
for whom traditional approaches had little to offer, it will continue. If,
over time, this approach proves unsuccessful, I expect it will be
abandoned, or at least refined to apply only to the cases with the greatest
chance of success. Wisconsin practitioners have not only worked
together, but have endeavored to share their experiences as part of a
statewide and even national dialogue.
From these efforts, the distinct roles described here have evolved.
The tendency of both proponents and critics to view the role of counsel
in problem-solving courts as one dimensional makes analysis of the new
and often complex ethical issues presented by problem-solving courts
unnecessarily difficult and problematic. A better approach is to examine
exactly what defense attorneys do in communities with problem-solving
courts in order to develop a taxonomy grounded in fact and experience-
the Wisconsin approach-rather than a critique based on caricature or
ideology. This is particularly so given the incredible variations and
relative novelty of problem-solving courts. An analysis grounded in fact
and experience is best suited to lead to the development of performance
standards and ethical guidelines for defense counsel's work in and with
problem-solving courts. Given the respect and guidance that has long
been afforded the work of the ABA, discussion of these issues in one or
more of the Criminal Justice Standards can make an invaluable
contribution to this dialogue.
envisions a slightly different, but also mixed, defense role:
Public Defender's Office/Defense Attorney
* Attend Team meetings as necessary
* Discuss pros and cons with potential participant before entering drug court
* Review cases for potential legal issues
* Discuss resolution of case with District Attorney before entering drug court
* Remain accessible to participant
* Advocate for fair process
* Maintain a non-adversarial role during Court proceedings
* Provide representation for the participant during termination proceedings if eligible
ST. CRoix Cwry. DRUG COURT PROGRAM, supra note 4. Here, items I and 7 focus on the public
defender as team member. Item 6 presumably applies to the public defender as a member of the initial
planning group and treatment team, and items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 focus on the public defender as attorney
for a client.
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